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Abstract
Machine learning as a service has given raise to privacy concerns surrounding
clients’ data and providers’ models and has catalyzed research in private inference
(PI): methods to process inferences without disclosing inputs. Recently, researchers
have adapted cryptographic techniques to show PI is possible, however all solutions
increase inference latency beyond practical limits. This paper makes the observa-
tion that existing models are ill-suited for PI and proposes a novel NAS method,
named CryptoNAS, for finding and tailoring models to the needs of PI. The key
insight is that in PI operator latency costs are inverted: non-linear operations (e.g.,
ReLU) dominate latency, while linear layers become effectively free. We develop
the idea of a ReLU budget as a proxy for inference latency and use CryptoNAS to
build models that maximize accuracy within a given budget. CryptoNAS improves
accuracy by 3.4% and latency by 2.4× over the state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
User privacy has recently emerged as a first-order constraint, sparking interest in private inference
(PI) using deep learning models: techniques that preserve data and model confidentiality without
compromising user experience (i.e., inference accuracy). In response to this concern, highly-secure
solutions for PI have been proposed using cryptographic primitives, namely with homomorphic
encryption (HE) and secure multi-party computation (MPC). However, both solutions incur substantial
slowdown to the point where even state-of-the-art techniques that combine HE and MPC cannot
achieve practical inference latency. Most prior work has focused on developing new systems (e.g.,
Cheetah [18]) and security protocols (e.g., MiniONN[14]) for privacy, while little effort has been
made to find new network architectures tailored to the needs of PI. Realizing practical PI requires a
better understanding of latency bottlenecks and new deep learning model optimizations to address
them directly.
Prior work on PI [12, 14, 16] has developed cryptographic protocols optimized for common CNN
operators. High-performance protocols take a hybrid approach to combine the strengths–and avoid
the pitfalls–of different cryptographic methods. Most protocols today use one method for linear (e.g.,
secret sharing [1] for convolutions) and another for non-linear layers (e.g., Yao’s garbled circuit [25]
for ReLUs). Figure 1 compares the cryptographic latency of ReLU and linear layers for the MiniONN
PI protocol [14] (details in Section 2). The data highlights how a layer’s “plaintext” latency has little
bearing on its corresponding cryptographic latency: ReLU operations dominate latency, taking up
to 10,000× longer to process than convolution layers. Given the inversion of operator latency costs,
enabling efficient PI requires developing new models that maximize accuracy while minimizing
ReLU operations, which we refer to as a model’s ReLU budget. This stands in stark contrast to
existing neural architecture search (NAS) approaches that focus only on optimizing the number of
floating point operations (FLOPs).
Based on this insight we propose two optimization techniques: ReLU reduction and ReLU balanc-
ing. ReLU reduction describes methods to reduce the ReLU counts starting from a ReLU-heavy
baseline network, for which two solutions are developed: ReLU pruning and ReLU shuffling.
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Figure 1: PI latency of a convolution and
following ReLU layer. The convolution
layer has input size 8×W×W with W∈
{8, 16, 32, 64} and filter size 8×3×3.
ReLU pruning removes unnecessary ReLUs from ex-
isting models, specifically from skip-connection and
re-shaping layers of CNNs. ReLU shuffling moves
the skip connection base such that the forwarded ac-
tivations are post-ReLU, eliminating the redundancy.
We show ReLU reduction is effective and can be
implemented with negligible accuracy impact, e.g.,
ReLU pruning reduces a model’s ReLU count by up
to 5.8× and reduces latency proportionately. ReLU
balancing scales the number of channels in the CNN
to maximize model capacity constrained by a ReLU
budget. We prove formally that the maximum model
capacity under a ReLU budget is achieved when con-
stant ReLUs per layer are used; in contrast, traditional channel scaling commonly assumes constant
FLOPs per layer [9, 23, 17]. ReLU balancing is most effective for smaller models, which benefit
the most from the additional parameters, providing an accuracy improvement of up to 3.75% on the
CIFAR-100 dataset.
Leveraging these optimizations, we propose CryptoNAS: a new and efficient automated search
methodology to find models that maximize accuracy within a given ReLU budget. CryptoNAS
searches over a space of feed-forward CNN architectures with skip connections (referred to as the
macro-search space in NAS literature [17, 27]). First, to incorporate constrained ReLU budgets,
CryptoNAS uses ReLU reduction to make skip connections effectively “free” in terms of latency.
Next, the number of channels in the core network, defined as the skip-free layers, are scaled based on
ReLU balancing, which keeps the number of ReLUs per layer constant. Finally, CryptoNAS uses an
efficient decoupled search procedure based on the observation that PI latency is dominated by the
ReLUs of the core network, while skips can be freely added to increase accuracy. CryptoNAS uses
the ENAS [17] macro search to determine where to add skips, and separately scales the size of the
core network to meet the ReLU budget.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Develop the idea of a ReLU budget, showing how ReLUs are the primary latency bottleneck
in PI to motivate the need for new research in ReLU-lean networks.
• Propose optimizations for ReLU-efficient networks. ReLU reduction (ReLU pruning and
shuffling) reduce network ReLU counts and ReLU balancing (provably) maximizes model
capacity per ReLU. Our ReLU reduction technique reduces ReLU cost by over 5× with
minimal accuracy impact, while ReLU balancing increases accuracy by 3.75% on a ReLU
budget.
• We develop CryptoNAS to automatically and efficiently find new models tailored for PI.
CryptoNAS decouples core and PI optimizations for search efficiency. Resulting networks
along the accuracy-latency Pareto frontier outperform prior work with accuracy (latency)
savings of 1.21% (2.2×) and 4.01% (1.3×) on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively.
2 Background on Private Inference
CryptoNAS implements the MiniONN protocol [14] for PI, using the same threat model and security
assumptions. We note, however, that the choice of PI protocol is largely independent of the qualitative
results; e.g., we expect similar benefit if secret sharing is replaced with HE, as done in Gazelle [12].
In this section we provide the necessary background for MiniONN and cryptographic primitives used.
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
MiniONN uses the forllowing two-party compute (2PC) cryptographic primitives: secret sharing for
linear layers and garbled circuits for non-linear operators. The protocol is executed between two
parties: a server (S), hosting the model, and a client (C) with the input data for inference using S’s
model.
Secret Sharing is a 2PC technique for computing additions and multiplications on secure data;
MiniONN uses the SPDZ version of secrete sharing [2]. Imagine that C and S wish to compute
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the dot-product operation y = w · x, where x ∈ Fn×1p , an n-dimensional column vector in finite
field, Fp, (defined by prime p) belongs to C. Similarly, row vector w ∈ F1×np belongs to S. To do
so, C first “blinds” x using a randomly picked vector r ∈ Fn×1p and sends xS = x− r to S. xS is
referred to as S’s “share.” C’s share is simply xC = r. Note that the sum of the client and server
shares equals the secret, i.e., xC + xS = x — this will hold true for any value shared between the
two parties. Note also that S cannot infer anything about x from its share alone.
To handle multiplications, the SPDZ protocol uses Beaver’s multiplication triples (<u, v, w · r>),
that are pre-computed off-line with w and r as inputs from S and C respectively. The protocol
generates and outputs u ∈ Fp to S and v ∈ Fp to C, such that (1) v is a random value and no party
learns the other party’s output; and (2) u + v = w · r. Using the triple, S can compute, yS , its
share of the result y as follows: yS = w · xS + u. C’s share is simply yC = v. One can verify that
yS + yC = y = w · x.
In practice, multiplication triples can be generated using HE. Although HE is computationally
expensive, this step can be performed offline if S’s input (w) is fixed — note that the triples only
require C’s random input r, which can also be generated offline. By moving triple generation offline,
the protocol’s online costs of performing a linear operation (e.g., a dot-product) is reduced to near
plain-text performance.
Yao’s Garbled Circuits (GC) Secret sharing only supports additions and multiplications, it cannot
be used for non-linear operations like ReLU. GC is an alternate secure 2PC solution that, unlike
secret sharing, works on Boolean representations of C’s and S’s inputs and allows the two parties to
compute a bi-variate Boolean function B : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1} without either party revealing
its input to the other. We briefly describe the GC protocol and refer the reader to [25] for more details.
The GC protocol represents function B as a Boolean logic circuit with 2-input logic gates. C and
S “evaluate” the circuit gate by gate; critically, each gate evaluation involves data transfer between
the parties and expensive cryptographic computations, i.e., AES decryptions. Thus, as observed in
Figure 1 the GC protocol incurs significant online cost per function evaluation. In practice, the GC
protocol is asymmetric in that one party acts as the so-called “garbler” and the other as the “evaluator.”
The evaluator obtains the encrypted output and shares it with the garbler. The encrypted output is
then decrypted by the garbler.
2.2 The MiniONN Protocol for Private Inference
Here we briefly summarize the MiniONN protocol and refer the reader to the original paper for
details [14]. MiniONN employs secret sharing and GC for private inference in a client-server (C-S)
setting where C and S keeps their inputs and model private, respectively. Building on MiniONN’s
terminology, we model a neural network containing D layers as:
yi+1 = f (Wi · yi + bi) ∀i ∈ [0, D − 1], (1)
where y0 = x is C’s input and yD = z is the output prediction. {Wi}i∈[0,D−1] and {bi}i∈[0,D−1]
are S’s model weights and biases, respectively, and f is the ReLU function.
Imagine that S and C have shares of layer i’s inputs, ySi and y
C
i , respectively. MiniONN first
uses secret sharing to compute shares of qi = Wi · yi + bi, which we will call qSi and qCi .
Recall that because multiplication triples are generated offline, this computation happens almost
as quickly as it would non-securely. Finally, the GC protocol is used to privately perform the
ReLU operation with S as the garbler and C as the evaluator. C contributes qCi and ri+1, its pre-
generated share of the subsequent layer’s input, while S contributes qSi . The GC protocol computes
ySi+1 = max(0,q
C
i + q
S
i )− ri+1; only S is able to decrypt this value and learn the output. C sets
yCi+1 = ri+1. It can be verified that C and S now hold shares of layer i’s outputs. The protocol
proceeds similarly for the next layer.
3 CryptoNAS: Finding Accurate, Low-Latency Networks for PI
We now present CryptoNAS: a method for finding accurate CNNs on a ReLU budget. A formal NAS
procedure described in Section 3.3, which comprises network optimizations to reduce ReLU counts
3
(a) Core Network (b) Conventional Skip Connection
(c) Shuffled Skip Connection (d) Pruned Skip Connection
Figure 2: Illustration of ReLU count reduction methods. (a) Core network prior to adding skip
connections. (b) Conventional skip connections increase ReLU counts. (c) ReLU shuffling preserves
the functionality of (b) but with lower ReLU cost. (d) ReLU pruning further reduces ReLU cost by
completely eliminating ReLUs from skips.
(Section 3.1) and maximize network parameters per ReLU (Section 3.2). Updates to the MiniONN
protocol to support skip connections are described in Section 3.4.
CryptoNAS Search Space As in prior work [27, 17], CryptoNAS searches over all feed-forward
depthD CNN architectures where layer i ∈ [0, D−1] has an input feature map of shapeHi×Hi×Ci
and performs standard convolutions with Ci+1 filters of size Fi × Fi × Ci. Layer i can take inputs
from any prior layer; the channels of the corresponding feature maps are concatenated and reshaped to
the appropriate input dimension using 1×1 convolutions, as shown in Figure 2. Vector Si ∈ {0, 1}i−1
indicates the preceding layers from which layer i takes inputs. Consequently, the design space for
CryptoNAS consists of the depth D and per-layer parameters {Hi, Ci, Fi,Si}i∈[0,D−1].
3.1 Reducing ReLU Counts
We find that many existing hand-crafted deep learning models and NAS techniques use ReLUs
indiscriminately — this isn’t surprising, as in plaintext inference ReLU latency if far less than MAC
operations and thus effectively free. We propose two simple optimizations for skip-based CNN layers
to (i) significantly reduce ReLUs while preserving accuracy (ReLU Shuffling) or (ii) saving even
more ReLUs in return for a small drop in accuracy (ReLU Pruning).
ReLU Shuffling A standard way (e.g., as done in DenseNets [11] and ENAS [17]) to add skip
connections is to forward the post-convolution output of a layer and concatenate it with the convolution
output of a future layer — the concatenated feature maps are then passed through a ReLU operation
and re-shaped, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, the number of ReLU operations in a layer is magnified by
the number of its incoming skip connections. ReLU shuffling proposes to move (shuffle) the standard
convolution-skip-ReLU sequence to convolution-ReLU-skip (see Figure 2(c)). In doing so, the ReLU
after the first convolution in the core network is reused by the skip-connection. In PI ReLU shuffling
is strictly beneficial: it precisely preserves network functionality to achieve the exact same accuracy
with fewer ReLUs.
ReLU Pruning With ReLU shuffling the cost of skip connections are reduced but skips still add
ReLUs to the core network. ReLU pruning goes a step further by removing all ReLUs introduced by
skips, as shown in Figure 2(d). We found that these ReLUs can be removed with only minor accuracy
impact. ReLU pruning further reduces ReLU counts by 2× over ReLU shuffling and we show in
Section 4 that for smaller ReLU budgets, it actually provides higher accuracy compared to ReLU
Shuffling while being competitive for higher ReLU budgets.
3.2 ReLU Balancing for Maximum Network Capacity
Many traditional networks (e.g., VGG [23], ResNet [9]) and NAS procedures [17, 27] keep the
number of FLOPs constant across layers — i.e., when the spatial resolution is reduced across pooling
layers (typically by a factor of two in each dimension), the number of channels is correspondingly
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increased (typically doubled)1. CryptoNAS’s optimization objective, i.e., to minimize ReLUs and not
FLOPs, suggests an alternate channel scaling rule wherein the number of ReLUs is kept constant
across layers. Indeed, we show that this rule is not only intuitively appealing, but also maximizes
model capacity (number of trainable parameters) for a fixed ReLU budget2.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a depth D CNN with Hi × Hi × Ci input tensors and F × F × Ci sized
convolutional filters in layer i for all i ∈ [0, D − 1] followed by a ReLU operation. Assuming
the spatial resolution is reduced by a factor of α in each pooling layer, the number of trainable
parameters given a fixed ReLU budget is maximized if Ci+1 = α2Ci after pooling layer i.
We show in Section 4 that ReLU balancing provides consistent wins in accuracy over traditional
FLOP balanced networks, especially for small ReLU budgets.
Algorithm 1 CryptoNAS Algorithm
1: Input: D := Set of network depths, Rbdg := ReLU Budget
2: Output: N ∗ := Highest accuracy model under Rbdg
3: Definitions:
4: Ci, Hi, Fi,Si := Channels, resolution, filter size and skip connections of layer i
5: α := resolution scaling factor
6: function CRYPTONAS(D, Rbdg)
7: for D ∈ D do
8: /* Optimize core network parameters
9: H∗i =
H0, if 0 < i ≤ D/3H0/α, if D/3 < i ≤ 2D/3H0/α2, otherwise C∗i =
Rbdg/DH
2
0 , if 0 < i ≤ D/3
βC1, if D/3 < i ≤ 2D/3
β2C1, otherwise
10:
11: {S∗i , F ∗i }i≤L ← ENAS(D) /* Run ENAS to optimize skip connections and filter sizes
12:
13: N ∗D = {{C∗i , H∗i , F ∗i ,S∗i }}i=0,...,D−1
14: N ∗ = argmaxD∈D acc(N ∗D)
15: return N ∗
3.3 The CryptoNAS Method
CryptoNAS uses the above optimizations to develop a NAS technique tailored to the needs of PI,
searching over a large space of CNNs with skip connections. Any architecture in this search space
can be viewed as containing two components: the core network (see Figure 2(a)) and the skip
connections between layers of the core. For a traditional FLOP constrained search, such as in [10],
these components are coupled: the FLOPs in a larger core network would have to be compensated with
fewer skips and vice-versa, requiring an expensive search over the product of these two sub-spaces.
Instead, CryptoNAS leverages the two optimizations described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 to efficiently
decouple the search, i.e., to search for the core network and skip connections separately. That is,
since skips are effectively free and the PI latency is dominated by the core network, searching for
the most accurate architecture under a ReLU budget breaks down into two separate questions: (i)
what is the most accurate core network within a ReLU budget and (ii) where should skips be added to
maximally increase the core network’s accuracy?
CryptoNAS answers these questions for networks of varying depth D picked from a set D specified
by the user (line 7), as described in Algorithm 1. For a given depth, CryptoNAS first determines
the core network’s parameters as follows. Consistent with a body of prior work on NAS, pooling
layers are inserted after at layers D3 and
2D
3 to reduce spatial resolution by a factor of α = 2
in each dimension. Following the ReLU balancing rule (Section 3.2), the number of channels is
correspondingly increased by a factor of α2 = 4 after each of the two pooling layers. With this
in place, the only remaining free variable is C1, the number of channels in the first layer; C1 (and
correspondingly the number of channels in all subsequent layers) is set to the largest values such that
total ReLU count of the core network is within the budget (line 9).
1Recall that FLOPs are proportional to the square of number of channels.
2See Appendix for the complete proof.
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Table 1: Comparing the accuracy of networks generated by CryptoNAS for different ReLU budgets
acheived by ReLU pruning and shuffling.
Model
(ReLU-Budget)
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
ReLU Pruning ReLU Shuffling ReLU Pruning ReLU Shuffling
Params Acc Params Acc Params Acc Params Acc
CNet2-100K 1.2M 92.18% 305K 90.71% 1.3M 68.67% 320K 66.46%
CNet2-500K 30M 94.41% 7.6M 94.51% 31M 77.2% 7.8M 77.69%
CNet2-1M 124M 95.00% 30M 95.47% 128M 79.07% 31M 79.71%
Separately, CryptoNAS uses ENAS macro-search [14] to determine the best skip connections for
each depth (line 11). ENAS is ideally suited for this purpose because the search procedure depends
on depth only and not the number of channels in the core model (recall that we seek to separately
scale the size of the core model). The skip connections returned by ENAS are then stitched into the
previously found core model. These two steps yield optimized networks for different depths. The
final step selects the model with the highest accuracy on the validation set (line 14). Experiments
show that CryptoNAS produces a Pareto frontier of points that outperform existing solutions (see
Section 4.2). Critically, for each point on the Pareto front, CryptoNAS performs only one ENAS
search followed by a single run to train the core model plus skips for each network depth explored.
3.4 Incorporating Skip Connections in MiniONN
The MiniONN protocol only considers skip-free CNNs. Here we extend MiniONN to support
skip connections, which are necessary for finding highly-accurate models. First, assume there is a
skip connection between layer i from the previous layer. Recall that skip connections are made by
concatenating the outputs of ReLU layers and reshaping the concatenation via a 1×1 convolution.
Thus, we can write the output of this concatenation layer as
yi+1 =W
′
i+1 · [y′i+1;yi] + b′i+1 (2)
where W′i+1 and b
′
i+1 are the weights and biases of the 1×1 convolution layer, and y′i+1 =
f(Wi · yi + bi). To compute this layer privately, S and C can generate multiplication triples offline
for weight W′i+1 and random value [y
′C
i+1;y
C
i ] (recall that the protocol takes these two inputs). The
random value in the multiplication triple protocol comes from C and is constructed by concatenating
C’s share of the two layers, which are determined in the offline phase as well. This construction is
easily extended to skip connections for multiple layers.
4 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate CryptoNAS and show that it outperforms the SOTA, analyze scaling
trends, and present a case study to show our optimizations generalize to architectures, beyond the
core CryptoNAS search space, e.g., WRNs [26].
4.1 Experimental Setup
CryptoNAS implements MiniONN [14] for PI with extensions described in Section 3.4. Beaver
triples are generated with the SEAL [4] library and the ABY library [3] is used for GC. We report
online runtimes for the client and server together. CryptoNAS is evaluated on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 [13]. We note that CIFAR-10/100 is the standard for both PI and NAS research due to the long
run times, and we chose them to be consistent with prior work. Datasets are preprocessed with image
centering (subtracting mean and dividing standard deviation), and images are augmented for training
using random horizontal flips, 4 pixel padding, and taking random crops. Experiments for latency
are run on a 3 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2690 processor with 60GB of RAM, and networks are trained on
Tesla P100 GPUs. We use CryptoNAS to discover three models with depth={6, 12, 24}, which we
refer to as CNet1, CNet2 and CNet3.
4.2 Results
ReLU shuffling and pruning reduce ReLUs with minimal impact on accuracy. Table 1 com-
pares the proposed ReLU shuffling (Figure 2(c)) and ReLU pruning (Figure 2(d)) optimizations for
6
Table 2: Results comparing channel scaling techniques across datasets (CIFAR10/100) with 3 models
depths (6, 12, 24). ReLU balancing produces the most accurate models on a ReLU budget.
Model
(Base-Dataset)
ReLU
Budget Depth
ReLU Balanced FLOP Balanced Channel Balanced
Params Acc Params Acc Params Acc
CNet1-C10 86K 6 1.4M 91.28% 352K 90.55% 94K 88.07%
CNet2-C10 344K 12 15M 94.04% 3.5M 93.98% 1M 93.07%
CNet3-C10 1376K 24 167M 95.55% 39M 95.49% 9M 95.09%
CNet1-C100 86K 6 1.3M 68.13% 313K 64.38% 94K 50.14%
CNet2-C100 344K 12 15M 75.64% 3.8M 74.05% 1.2M 69.21%
CNet3-C100 1376K 24 142M 79.59% 34M 79.23% 9M 77.00%
*MiniONN: 81.6% accuracy
CNet3-50K
CNet1-86K
CNet1-100K
CNet2-334K
CNet2-500K
CNet3-1M
CNet3-1.38M
(a) CIFAR-10
CNet3-50K
CNet1-86K
CNet1-100K
CNet2-334K
CNet2-500K
CNet2-1M CNet3-1.38M
(b) CIFAR-100
Figure 3: PI runtimes for CryptoNAS networks compared to state-of-the-art on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets. The runtime is the sum of client and server online costs.
different ReLU budgets on the CNet2 model. The ENAS baseline (Figure 2(b)) version of these
models have 385K, 1.92M , and 3.89M ReLUs; the accuracy of the ENAS baseline is the same as
obtained via ReLU shuffling. We observe that compared to baseline, ReLU shuffling reduce ReLU
counts by about 1.9× for this model (across all modes we see up to 4.76× drop in ReLU counts)
without compromising accuracy. For the same reduction in ReLU counts, ReLU pruning provides
2.2% higher accuracy for CIFAR-100 at a 100K ReLU budget, but incurs a small accuracy drop for
larger ReLU budgets (0.64% for 1M budget).
ReLU balanced scaling maximizes accuracy. Next we evaluate our channel scaling rule opti-
mization, ReLU balancing, against the commonly used FLOP balancing approach and a strawman
“channel balancing” solution that has the same number of channels in each layer. Our results are
shown in Table 2. We find that ReLU balancing always outperforms competing scaling techniques,
likely because of its significantly larger model capacity under ReLU constraints. For CNet1-C100 at
an 86K ReLU budget, ReLU balancing increases accuracy by 3.75% compared to traditional FLOP
balancing. The benefits are most significant at lower ReLU budgets likely because these models
underfit and benefit more from increased capacity.
Efficiency of CryptoNAS search procedure. The total runtime of CryptoNAS for a given ReLU
budget involves a single ENAS run to find filter sizes and skip connections and a single training of
the scaled core model with skip connections added per network depth explored. Running ENAS on
CNet3 (our largest model) for CIFAR-100 dataset takes about 22hrs on relatively slow P100 GPUs,
and final training takes about 19hrs.
CryptoNAS models outperform prior art across the accuracy-latency Pareto frontier. Using
CryptoNAS, we sweep a range of model depths and ReLU budgets to understand latency-accuracy
tradeoffs in PI and plot the Pareto points in Figure 3 (CryptoNAS in red). We compare CryptoNAS
against prior work that (a) achieve state-of-art performance using standard augmentation and ReLU
activations including ResNets [9] and DenseNets [11], (b) networks like MobileNets-v2 [22] that are
optimized for FLOPs instead of ReLUs, (c) the ENAS-macro and ENAS-micro search results [17],
and (d) networks from prior work on PI including MiniONN [14] and Delphi [15].
We see that CryptoNAS’s Pareto frontier dominates all prior points for regions of interest. On
CIFAR-10, CNet2-100K has 0.93% higher accuracy while being 2.2× faster on inference latency
compared to ResNet-20, and a more than 10% accuracy improvement over MiniONN. Compared
to ResNet-110, CNet3-500K is 1.9× faster with 1.31% higher accuracy. CryptoNAS compares
even more favorably to MobileNet-v2; CryptoNAS is 1.2× faster with 1.31% higher accuracy. On
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CIFAR-100, CNet2-1M is 3.49% more accurate than DenseNet-12-40 while being 1.5× faster. We
also achieve gains over Delphi, with CNet-100K being 1.6× and 2.4× faster than Delphi with 200K
and 300K ReLU budget respectively and 2.07% and 1.07% more accurate.
We note that while Delphi does better than CryptoNAS for the smallest (50K) ReLU budget, it does
so by systematically replacing a fraction of ReLUs with qaudratic activations. In our evaluations,
we give the benefit of considering all non-ReLU activations free. Second, we note that Delphi’s
optimizations are orthogonal to ours; replacing ReLUs in CryptoNAS networks with quadratics might
yield further benefits. Finally, we note that the largest models from prior work provide slightly higher
accuracy, but at impractically high PI latency of more than 30 minutes per inference. Down scaling
these models to smaller sizes resulted in much lower accuracy than comparable CryptoNAS networks.
CryptoNAS optimizations generalize to other network architectures. We note that although we
have thus far applied CryptoNAS’s optimizations to ENAS-like CNN models, the optimizations
are not ENAS specific and can be used to improve other models as well. As an example, we
implemented ReLU balanced channel scaling to wide residual networks (WRN) [26] and found
consistent improvements in accuracy relative to the baseline FLOP balanced WRNs for iso-ReLU
budgets. Despite the more aggressive baseline, CryptoNAS still outperforms re-scaled WRN across a
range of ReLU budgets, see Table 3 in the Appendix for complete results.
5 Related Work
In this section we discuss prior work on PI and NAS as related to CryptoNAS. CryptoNets [8], one of
the earliest works on PI used fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to guarantee data (but not model)
privacy. Due to its reliance on FHE for all network layers, CryptoNets is restricted to using only
polynomial activations. Subsequent work, including MiniONN [14], SecureML [16], Gazelle [12]
and Delphi [15] seek to provide both data and model privacy and support standard activations like
ReLUs; to do so, they switch between separately optimized protocols for linear layers and non-linear
layers. Common to these protocols is the use of expensive GC for ReLU activations. As such,
we expect CryptoNAS’s benefits to extend to these protocols as well. In addition to cryptographic
optimizations, Delphi [15] also proposes to automatically replace a subset of ReLUs with quadratic
activations using an automated search procedure. While CryptoNAS outperforms Delphi for all
but one data-point, Delphi’s optimizations are orthogonal to ours and can be applied to networks
discovered by CryptoNAS. Nonetheless, we note that large quadratic networks are hard to train [7].
A separate line of work, DeepSecure [21] and XONN [20], has proposed PI methods for binarized
neural networks but these typically have lower accuracy than conventional networks.
There is a large and growing body of work on NAS including methods that make use of Bayesian
optimization [10], reinforcement learning (RL) [27], hill-climbing [5], genetic algorithms [19], etc.
We refer the reader to an excellent survey paper by Elsken et al. [6] for more details. Most relevant to
this work are multi-objective NAS methods, for example, MnasNet [24], that uses measured model
latency to optimize for inference time and accuracy. While these approaches could also be used to
optimize for ReLU costs, they would still end up searching over spaces with a relatively high number
of ReLUs per FLOP. The ReLU optimizations and decoupled search insights in CryptoNAS should
help these approaches as well in terms of both accuracy and search efficiency.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents CryptoNAS, a new NAS method to minimize PI latency based on the observation
that ReLUs are the primary latency bottleneck in PI. This observation motivates the need for new
research in “ReLU-lean” networks. To this end, we have proposed optimizations to obtain ReLU-lean
networks including ReLU reduction via ReLU pruning and shuffling, and ReLU balancing that
(provably) maximizes model capacity per ReLU. ReLU reduction yields > 5× reductions in ReLU
cost with minimal impact on accuracy, while ReLU balancing increases accuracy by 3.75% on a fixed
ReLU budget compared to traditional approaches. Finally, we develop CryptoNAS to automatically
and efficiently find new models tailored for PI based on a decoupling of the search space. Resulting
networks along the accuracy-latency Pareto frontier outperform prior work with accuracy (latency)
savings of 1.21% (2.2×) and 4.01% (1.3×) on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively.
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A Proof of ReLU Balancing Rule
We present the proof of Lemma 3.1 here.
Proof. We seek to optimize the number of trainable parameters, i.e.:
max
∑
i∈[0,D−1]
F 2C2i
subject to a constraint on the total number of ReLUs, which we can write as:∑
i∈[0,D−1]
W 20
α2i
Ci ≤ Rbdg.
To solve this problem, we maximize its Lagrangian:
max
∑
i∈[0,D−1]
F 2C2i − λ
 ∑
i∈[0,D−1]
W 20
α2i
Ci −Rbdg

Setting derivatives with respect to Ci to zero, we get Ci =
λW 20
2F 2α2i and hence, Ci+1 = α
2Ci.
B CryptoNAS Generalized to Other Networks
Table 3 explores ReLU balanced channel scaling for original wide residual networks, as well as
models scaled to lower ReLU budgets (WRN-16-4 and WRN-16-2). We observe that ReLU balanced
models have more parameters and improve accuracy compared to FLOP balanced models for the
same ReLU budget.
Table 3: Exploring ReLU ballancing in Wide ResNet architectures.
Model ReLUBudget
FLOP Balanced ReLU Balanced
Params Acc Params Acc
WRN-16-2 245K 703K 94.06% 2.6M 94.89%
WRN-16-4 475K 2.8M 95.39% 10.4M 95.6%
WRN-16-8 933K 11.0M 95.73% 42M 96.01%
WRN-40-4 1392K 8.9M 95.47% 36M 96.28%
WRN-28-10 2310K 36.5M 96.00% 144M 96.28%
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